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Abstract 
In the early decades of the twentieth century the experience of time as crisis became 
the catalyst for a fundamental reorientation in the relationship between historical 
materialism and idealism, leading to the rejection of simplistic mechanical concepts 
of historical time. This reorientation represents a turning point in the history of 
European ideas, clearly evident in the work of two major thinkers of this period, 
usually associated with opposing political ideologies: the Marxist theorist Walter 
Benjamin and the liberal philosopher Benedetto Croce. Based on a conceptual 
framework borrowed partly from Reinhart Koselleck, this article explains how the 
experience of acute crisis led both thinkers to develop a new understanding of 
historical time, which shows surprising parallels. Both authors used the reorientation 
in the relationship between idealism and materialism to criticize positivist approaches 
to the analysis of historical change and to reject deterministic accounts of the future. 
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Modernity and modern time are experienced as change, change offering 
opportunities or presenting threats - positive or negative challenges. Since the late 
eighteenth century and throughout the Age of Revolution most European and 
American observers experienced modernity as an acceleration of time. Towards the 
end of the nineteenth century continuously increasing levels of modernity culminated 
in the consciousness of crisis which is widely associated with the Fin-de-siècle. This 
crisis was followed by the collapse of the Old Europe during World War One, the 
totalitarian dictatorships and the genocides of the interwar period, the Second World 
War, and the Shoah. 
 
Shortly before his suicide in 1942 Stefan Zweig described his experience of the 
present as the end of “yesterday’s world”. Thomas Mann, Friedrich Meinecke and 
others used the term catastrophe to articulate how they experienced the end of their 
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life worlds.1 In this context probably the most famous reference to the experience of 
time as catastrophe can be found in Walter Benjamin’s last manuscript of 1940 (first 
published posthumously as a special issue of the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung in 
1942), Über den Begriff der Geschichte.2 What many of these descriptions have in 
common is the reference to a specific semantic of historical time. At the core of this 
experience is the consciousness of a constant acceleration with which the old world 
approaches its own end, a process to which humankind is completely subjected. This 
acute crisis was experienced as the coming of an apocalyptic moment, the end of 
time. There is only one way of making sense of this fear of Endzeit, which is to 
imagine the experience of one’s own death. End of time becomes meaningful 
through the fear of and the confrontation with death. This feeling is the source of 
despair when being subjected to the acceleration of time towards the end of time 
itself. 
 
In his famous entry on the concept of Kritik in Historische Grundbegriffe, Reinhart 
Koselleck pointed to the term’s bipolar semantic significance in social and political 
language as “criticism” and “crisis” (Kritik and Krise). Investigating the concept’s 
historical meaning and its role in social and political language, Koselleck 
demonstrated how humankind articulated the experience of modernity as a change in 
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 See for instance W. Wippermann, “Deutsche Katastrophe. Meinecke, Ritter und der 
erste Historikerstreit”, in: Friedrich Meinecke in seiner Zeit. Studien zu Leben und 
Werk, eds G. Bock / D. Schönpflug (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006), 177-191. 
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 W. Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte, in: Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt 
/ M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), I.2: 691-704. For an English edition see W. Benjamin, 
Selected Writings, 4: 1938-40 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). On the 
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the semantic of historical time.3 In the early decades of the twentieth century the 
articulation of this experience as crisis became the catalyst for a fundamental 
reorientation in the way some critical observers understood the relationship between 
historical materialism and idealism, forming the basis for a new conceptualisation of 
their own experience of historical time. This reorientation, as well as the role of the 
experience of crisis within this process, represents a major turning point in the history 
of European ideas. While other commentators have noticed that particular thinkers 
during this period reconfigured the relationship between materialism and idealism, 
they ignored the extent to which this shift originates in a specific experience of time. 
Moreover, historians of 20th-century European thought tend to look at these thinkers 
in isolation and according to pre-defined schemes of classification along ideological 
or political lines. As a consequence, they have neglected the extent to which this shift 
represents a general phenomenon which allows us to see communalities between 
thinkers whom we would otherwise not discuss in relation to each other.  
 
The reorientation in the relationship between materialism and idealism is clearly 
evident in the work of two major European thinkers of this period, usually associated 
with opposing political ideologies: the Marxist theorist Walter Benjamin and the liberal 
philosopher Benedetto Croce. Croce’s philosophy had a major impact on the work of 
Antonio Gramsci as well as on the ideological orientation of important strands of the 
Italian Resistance, in particular the movement Giustizia e Libertà. Benedetto Croce 
was an international icon of anti-Fascism and widely considered Europe’s most 
influential philosopher during the first half of the twentieth century. It is largely due to 
the political developments of the post-war period (and partly to his own rather 
unfortunate explanation of the origins of Italian Fascism) that Croce’s role within 
European philosophy diminished since the 1950s (at least internationally). Academia 
turned away from idealist conceptions of history and new directions within Marxist 
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 R. Koselleck, “Crisis”, Journal of the History of Ideas 67, 2, (April 2006): 357-400. 
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theory left little space for his ideas. The interest of the English-speaking world in 
Antonio Gramsci since the 1970s did not lead to a renaissance of Croce’s thought. 
 
The reception of Benjamin’s thought worked the other way round. At the time of his 
death only a few specialists knew his work and early editions of his fragmentary 
writings rarely reached more than a few hundred readers. When Peter Suhrkamp, 
with the help of Theodor and Gretel Adorno, edited in 1955 the first two volumes of 
essays by Benjamin, he found only 816 buyers for the edition, of a print-run of 
2,300.4 During the 1950s and early 1960s ideological and theoretical debates in 
scholarship hardly touched upon Benjamin’s work. The renaissance of Benjamin 
started in the second half of the 1960s with the publication of selected works in 
German, and took off in the 1970s when the first volumes of the critical edition 
started to appear. Then, apart from the more specialized discussion by scholars of 
Jewish thought, debate on Benjamin was for a long time restricted to Marxist 
theorists, before his work gained an important basis among literary scholars, art 
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 S. Unseld, “Walter Benjamin and the Suhrkamp Verlag”, in For Walter Benjamin, 
eds I. and K. Scheuermann (Bonn: AsKI, 1993), 12-14. 
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historians and cultural theorists. It took until 1982 to complete the German edition of 
the Passagen-Werk, which then sold 700,000 copies within the first decade.5  
 
Scholarship ignores that Croce’s and Benjamin’s observations on philosophy of 
history, and their impact on European thought as a whole, have a common source, 
which is the two authors’ specific experience of their own time as crisis. There are 
also important parallels to Koselleck’s (and to some extent Gadamer’s) work on the 
semantics of historical time, even if Koselleck does not relate his own theories to 
either Croce or Benjamin.6 One can identify a bridge between Croce’s and 
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 ibid. For an overview of 80 years of debate on Benjamin see Walter Benjamin. 
Critical evaluations in cultural theory, ed. P. Osborne (London: Routledge, 2005). 
Also Materialien zu Benjamins Thesen ‘Über den Begriff der Geschichte’. Beiträge 
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strands of the German reception during the 1970s and 1980s. See for instance Walter 
Benjamin. Profane Erleuchtung und rettende Kritik. eds N. W. Bolz and R. Faber 
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Begriff der Geschichte (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1983), 9 ff. On the origins of the 
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 The reason for this is probably that from the mid-1930s, due to political reasons, 
Croce was largely ignored in German academia. Gadamer refers to Croce’s translator 
Collingwood, but not to Croce himself. An important connection between the 
concepts of historical time in Benjamin, Croce and Koselleck might be Heidegger, but 
this would require further research. See in this context H. Caygill, “Benjamin, 
Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition”, in Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy. 
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Benjamin’s thought in the work of Arnaldo Momigliano, who was deeply influenced by 
Croce and his concept of history as the history of freedom, but who also worked 
closely with Benjamin’s intimate friend and his most influential commentator, 
Gershom Scholem.7 However, Momigliano referred to Benjamin only briefly and 
although he frequently comments on the influence of Croce in his writings, his 
references to the philosopher’s theory of history are usually implicit rather than 
explicit.8 What I wish to suggest by connecting these different thinkers to the work of 
Croce and Benjamin is that Croce’s and Benjamin’s thought on the semantics of 
historical time had a much wider impact then previously recognised, but that this 
presents a constellation which as yet has not been sufficiently explored. 
 
In the following, I will explain how the critical experience of a shift in the meaning of 
historical time led both Croce and Benjamin to the development of a new concept of 
history, which shows surprising parallels. Since the 1920s both men witnessed how 
different political ideologies attempted to reduce historical time to a deterministic 
prism, which allowed totalitarian regimes to manipulate society into an inescapable 
logic of a future-oriented historical processes. While Croce refers in his critique 
mostly to the futurist ideology of the Fascist regimes, Benjamin’s target is the 
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international Labour movement and its passive attitude to Fascism. Through their 
respective analysis of the underlying circumstances Croce and Benjamin attempted 
to dismantle the conceptual incoherence of historical determinism and to free 
humankind from misunderstood philosophies of history. This article argues that 
overcoming the opposition between idealism and materialism presents the key to 
their new concept of historical time. In the following I will first discuss Benjamin, 
before relating his concept of history to that of Croce. This is despite the fact that 
most of Croce’s works on this problem were written before Benjamin’s manuscript 
Über den Begriff der Geschichte and that Benjamin was aware of Croce and 
commented on some of his work. However, chronology is not directly relevant to my 
argument and I wish to avoid giving the impression that I understand Benjamin’s 
position as directly influenced by Croce. Benjamin himself explained in a letter to 
Gretel Adorno that his manuscript Über den Begriff der Geschichte contained 
thoughts which he had kept to himself for over twenty years, before writing them 
down.9 Hence, to some extent his thought even predates Croce’s, although it was the 
experience of exile and captivity which led him to conceptualize these ideas. My main 
concern here is to understand the reorientation in the relationship between idealism 
and materialism as a consequence of the experience of crisis, which Benjamin 
articulates even more emphatically than Croce.10 
 
As Koselleck reminds us, in classical Greek the concepts critique and crisis were 
represented by the same term, the former describing a subjective process, the latter 
an objective state. In its historical use the term had either a medical or a religious 
connotation, but containing the possibility of salvation. Crisis anticipates in its 
ultimate and most extreme form the end of the world and will reveal justice. The Last 
Judgment is a crisis, in the sense of judicium, where the promise of salvation, of 
eternity and of a life after the end of time presents a fundamental aspect of the 
eschatological concept. Considering any historical notions of the end of time we have 
to consider the extent to which these concepts are embedded in Western culture and 
more generally in monotheistic traditions of thought.  
 
The sister concepts of critique and crisis, and the consciousness of a dramatic 
change in the semantic of historical time during the first half of the twentieth century, 
are at the center of the reorientation in the relationship between historical materialism 
and idealism, which this article wishes to discuss. There are a number of key texts 
which form the basis for my argument and which are considered here within the 
wider context of their authors’ work. These texts are Benjamin’s last manuscript Über 
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den Begriff der Geschichte and Croce’s Antistoricismo as well as his Storia d’Europa. 
Another text relevant to this discussion is Gramsci’s Il materialismo storico e la 
filosofia di Benedetto Croce. 
 
Empirically explored in Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels and the fragments of 
the Passagen-Werk, but conceptualized in Über den Begriff der Geschichte, 
Benjamin rejects the deterministic illusion of a linear concept of time as it was 
formalised in the idea of a progress-oriented philosophy of history since Hegel.11 The 
following presents a synthesis of his Über den Begriff der Geschichte, privileging 
those aspects of the text which are mostly relevant for the argument of this article. 
 
In Über den Begriff der Geschichte Benjamin describes the concept of time 
inherent in the logic of historical materialism as a positivist illusion (I, VI). The 
future (including the promise of salvation) is constructed out of a 
contemporary present, in the same way in which the past (with its own 
futures) is constructed through the present. The basis of the materialist’s 
future is the narration of a particular past. The materialist - as well as his or 
her object of study – is determined by ideas, by a specific idea of future time. 
(II and IV) In thesis VI Benjamin presents us with a materialist and dialectic 
account of the Last Judgement: “the Messiah comes not only as the 
Redeemer”, but “to overbear the Antichrist”. What this means with regard to 
concepts of past and future becomes clearer in thesis IX, where Benjamin 
refers to Paul Klee’s painting Angelus Novus, which had been in his 
possession since 1921. Reflections on Klee’s angel had become a key 
element in Benjamin’s thought and a catalyst for his revision of historical 
materialism. In Benjamin’s interpretation the angel is walking backwards and 
stares with wide open wings at a past from which he moves away.  
  
Benjamin describes Klee’s angel as the angel of history, who knows that 
there is eternal life. What humankind perceives as a chain of past events 
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 See in particular the important work by S. Mosès, Der Engel der Geschichte. Franz 
Rosenzweig, Walter Benjamin, Gerschom Scholem (Frankfurt /M.: Jüdischer Verlag, 
1994), chpt.5 and 134 f. Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte. 
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which determine a particular future, the angel sees accumulating into 
catastrophe, with no connection to the projected and artificially constructed 
future. The angel’s wings are blown up by the storm of time, which originates 
from paradise. This storm is what we call and perceive as progress. In the 
following Benjamin provides us with a contemporary political reading of this 
image (X). 
 
The politicians, in whom the opponents of Fascism had put their hopes, have 
either betrayed their own ideals or they were destroyed by the present 
constellation of power. Benjamin holds their stubborn belief in progress 
responsible for the current conditions. The socialists’ belief that the 
development of the productive forces will inevitably lead to socialism presents 
an illusion, which allowed the dominant classes to maintain and extend their 
power. Moreover, the technocratic logic of modernisation, which is inherent in 
the socialists’ idealisation of labour and forms a crucial element in their 
deterministic view of history, shares common ground with Fascism. (XI) The 
strength of historical materialism lies in the fact that it recognized the 
existence of a working class and the role it may play in the historical process. 
The problem, for Benjamin, is not the materialist base, the role assigned to 
the forces of production in determining the present, but the philosophies of 
past time associated with these facts. Despite its insights in the societal 
power relations, the Labour movement abandoned the idea to free the 
working class in the present, assigning this role to future generations. It 
sacrificed its power and as a consequence the working class lost its role in 
the present. (XII) Therefore, the Labour movement’s error is its blind belief in 
the historical progress of humanity, which paralysed it for the present. (XIV) 
History is always subjectively constructed in the present. For Robespierre, 
Ancient Rome was a past of his own present, which he separated from 
historical continuity.12 The French Revolution became the new Rome. Another 
example Benjamin evokes is fashion, which makes reference to past 
costumes, jumping into a past from a position which is circumscribed by 
present power relations. Marx understands revolution in exactly the same 
way, as a dialectic movement which separates the revolutionary future from 
the continuum of the past, as a moment of complete rupture, symbolized by 
the introduction of new calendars to document the revolutionary acceleration 
of historical time. (XIV, XV) Materialist historiography consists in identifying a 
revolutionary opportunity in a particular future and separating it from its 
historical continuum. (XVII)  
 
Über den Begriff der Geschichte rejects the Labour Movement’s blind belief in 
progress and outlines the shortcomings of a historical materialism based on the 
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deterministic conviction of the revolution’s inevitability. It is this constellation of 
historical time which paralysed the working class for the present. The materialist 
basis of the socialists’ concept of time gives the revolutionary future an aura of 
positive reality, but this constructed reality leads to an illusion. Blinded by this illusion 
and helplessly awaiting the realisation of its future, humankind runs into catastrophe, 
the catastrophe which Benjamin himself witnessed since the outbreak of the Second 
World War.  
 
Scholem described the theses outlined in Über den Begriff der Geschichte as the 
result of Benjamin’s “awakening from the shock of the Hitler-Stalin pact”,13 which 
better than anything represents what the revolutionary movement had become. For 
Benjamin this was a personal revelation, but also a catalyst to rethink his 
understanding of historical materialism. From a theoretical point of view Benjamin 
had abandoned the rigidity of historical materialism already two decades earlier. His 
interest in Marxist theory remained limited and much of his work since the 1920s 
pays witness to a much more flexible understanding of the past.14 The fact that he 
finally conceptualized his thoughts during his unsuccessful attempt to escape from 
Hitler’s Europe is in itself significant. This was Benjamin’s most acute realisation of 
time as crisis. But when the gendarmerie at Portbou stopped him in the Pyrenees, we 
do not know if Benjamin abandoned his hope that humanity might overcome the 
deterministic illusion of this manipulated future. It is a matter of uncertainty if 
Benjamin committed suicide in Portbou or if his death was an accident.15 
 
Benjamin’s concept of Eingedenken, the contemplation of an open past in the 
present, has a strong theological component and shows similarities to Franz 
Rosenzweig’s attempted synthesis of theology and philosophy.16 It also represents a 
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strongly subjective and idealist component in Benjamin’s thought. But contrary to 
Gershom Scholem’s hopes of the 1930s and despite Benjamin’s early interest Jewish 
mysticism, Benjamin’s principal objective in Über den Begriff der Geschichte was not 
a translation of Jewish mysticism into an idiom of the modern age.17 Instead, his 
target was the concept of historical time which determined the policies of the Labour 
movement, a critique generated by his own experience of crisis. The concept of 
historical time which Benjamin developed in this critique contained theological 
elements, but there also remains a strong materialist foundation. As Abraham Socher 
explains, when Scholem dedicated Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism to Benjamin it 
“was an act of disappointment as well as mourning”.18 In the opening of Ursprung des 
deutschen Trauerspiels Benjamin employed a Kabbalistic text to illustrate his idea of 
the origin of words; but in earlier versions of the passage there is evidence to 
suggest that he might have misunderstood the passage he was referring to. His 
projects to learn Hebrew were abandoned and in his later writings direct references 
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to Jewish mysticism are less obvious, despite the Messianic elements in his concept 
of history. What the materialist conception of history shares with theology is the 
concept of utopia, here more specifically the memory of the lost paradise or the reign 
of freedom in a Marxist sense. For both it is a promise, which helps believers not to 
despair in face of the present past.19 Meanwhile, this future retains a dialectic 
dynamic. In thesis VI Benjamin explains that “the Messiah comes not only as the 
Redeemer”, but “to overbear the Antichrist”. As Tiedemann has demonstrated, 
nowhere in this work “Benjamin talks more instantaneously theologically, nowhere is 
his intention more materialist.”20 The antichrist is the ruling class, the Messiah its 
opponent in the class struggle.  
 
Since the 1980s Benjamin was occasionally read as an apostle of postmodernism.21 
However, his insistence on multiple structures of time, each with their own past, 
present and future, is not meant to result in an arbitrary interpretation of historical 
time. The fact that Benjamin expanded the material basis of his philosophy of history 
to include cultural production and psychological phenomena, and that he employs a 
specific theological and metaphysical tradition to explain changes in the semantic of 
time, does not mean that he rejected all principles of historical materialism or that he 
understood the theological component of his thinking as a contradiction of its 
materialist base. Instead, the theological dimension of his thought indicates a 
fundamental anthropological experience in the process of cognition which for 
Benjamin became an asset helping him to refine historical materialism. 
 
More than a purely theoretical conceptualisation, Benjamin’s last manuscript reflects 
an existential experience of time at a specific moment in European history. Benjamin 
witnessed the 1930s as an acceleration of time towards a catastrophic end, moving 
at a speed which blows into the wings of his angel. The total catastrophe which 
Benjamin’s angel faced and from which he seems to retreat stood for an 
eschatological concept of crisis. However, historically the coming of this cosmic crisis 
is anticipated by the knowledge of redemption, which grants eternal life. This is the 
element of hope in Benjamin’s interpretation of Klee’s messenger, who stares into 
the catastrophe of history, but knows about the Adamic paradise.  
 
The theological dimension in Benjamin’s work is more than symbolic. It stands for the 
agency of ideas, countering the determinism of the current ideologies of history. The 
crisis is objective; his criticism, nurtured by the consciousness of past time, is 
subjective, positioned conceptually against the historical determinism of his age.22 
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 On a philosophical level Benjamin’s thought contrasts strongly with Ernst Bloch’s 
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Using Koselleck’s terminology, the theological dimension in Über den Begriff der 
Geschichte can be understood as an example of Verzeitlichung, as a “new temporal 
horizon”.23 What Benjamin’s Angelus Novus confronts is exactly such a moment of 
crisis, “the apocalyptical foreshortening of time that precedes the Last Judgment”, the 
cosmological idea of God as the master of time, but used here in a secular-
metaphorical sense. Under the impact of his own existential experience of time 
Benjamin understands historical progress as the catastrophe itself, which he wishes 
to void by pulling the emergency break and freeing the present from its historical-
semantic cage.  
 
At the root of his cognitive experience is his own remembering of the past, an idealist 
moment, which provokes in him a new consciousness of historicity and which can be 
compared to Marcel Proust’s concept of remembering le temps perdu. (He developed 
this concept in connection with his research for the Passagen-Werk and his 
translations of Proust.) For Benjamin, this particular form of historicity is an instance 
evoked against the fatal linearity of historical time. It also restores an idealist 
dimension into the conception of time. In his critique of materialist teleology Benjamin 
identifies a problem which less than a generation later, and still under the impact of 
the same catastrophe, Koselleck described in Kritik und Krise as the pathogenesis of 
the bourgeois world. For Benjamin, like for Koselleck, the fatality of historical 
determinism is behind the social dynamic which characterizes the rise of the 
totalitarian dictatorships and which leads the masses to accept their political regimes 
as the inevitable logic of a historical development.24 Benjamin’s own dynamic view of 
historical time, according to which each present has its own past and future, is 
directed against the same fatal illusions.  
 
Benjamin’s angel is a reference to the idea of eternity and to a specific Jewish 
tradition, which survived in Christian thought and which Romanticism had liberated 
from scholarly dogmatism, making it an almost secularised cultural concept. His 
concept of crisis develops out of the enlightenment use of the term, positioned 
against the idealist philosophy of history of the post-enlightenment, which was at the 
basis of the major ideological currents and the totalitarian regimes of the early 
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twentieth century.25 Rejecting the degeneration of enlightenment thought into a 
deterministic philosophy of history, Benjamin’s Rückbesinnung on the concept of 
critique/crisis becomes an instance capable of stopping humanity’s march into 
catastrophe. His idea of eternity contradicts any determinist conception of history.  
 
Benjamin arrives at this conception analytically, through knowledge of theological 
concepts, as a scholar of literature and through the observation of his own time. The 
theological concept works here as an anthropological Urphänomen, a basic human 
experience of recognition. As Joseph Mali has argued, Benjamin understands 
Ursprung “in genealogical rather than biological terms, contending that it was not to 
be found in the moment of intuition but rather in that of recognition”.26 For Benjamin 
the basis of this recognition is myth; in Habermas’ words it constitutes “the semantic 
potential from which human beings draw”.27 The theological dimension and the role 
of redemption in his concept of time are part of Benjamin’s mythological perception of 
reality, part of humanity’s ancient hopes and dreams. Myths offer “a reservoir of 
meanings" (Koselleck), explored as a source of strength and happiness.28 They 
constitute part of the Erwartungshorizont, which is historical in so far as it impacts on 
the present within the stream of historical time. 
 
The materialist dimension of Benjamin’s concept of time lies in the fact that history is 
the history of class struggle: a dialectical process. Also redemption, for Benjamin, is 
not idealist but materialist. “As fighter in the class struggle”, Gerhard Kaiser explained 
in his comment on Benjamin, “man is the subject of history”, but in the realm of ideas 
he is also “object of the redemption”, which represents the end of history altogether, 
understood as an idea rather than a historical fact.29 Instead of considering dialectic 
as automatically leading to victory, it is a materialist struggle with an open end. What 
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Messianic tradition understands as divine intervention is for Benjamin human 
recognition of time. This constitutes a Messianic moment – symbolised by the angel 
as a messenger of God - but redemption itself is not beyond human power as long as 
the recognition of time itself is a human act. Redemption is part of a man made 
history, in the sense of Vico.30 Man’s messianic power lies in the fact that he is the 
subject of the historical process and has the capacity to resist philosophy of history. 
This subjectivity represents the idealist dimension of Benjamin’s concept of historical 
time. Benjamin’s is a philosophy of praxis, like that of Croce and Gramsci.  
 
As Stéphane Mosès has demonstrated, for Benjamin it is the role of the materialist 
historian to recover relics of auratic experience, elements of a past, original truth, 
somewhere hidden in our modern and profane world.31 This is what Benjamin himself 
does in his work as historian, when he understands the Paris of his time as one of a 
specific historicity, specific to his own present, the present he observes. The 
revolutionary historian reveals the dimension of the new in history, without applying 
principles of causality. Thus, history becomes political; the present becomes 
judgment. Not unlike Koselleck’s understanding of historical time, history is not 
universal but present, comparable to the way in which art, for Benjamin, is never 
historical, but always new: no work is just the response to another work, but product 
of a creative genius. For Hegel history is the judge over time; for Benjamin it is the 
present, which reveals its own history.32 Benjamin’s temporality is therefore 
discontinuous, polycentric, and consequently opposed to determinism and the illusion 
of progress. As Mosès argues, in Benjamin past, present and future are specific 
conditions of the historical consciousness.33 
 
A very similar idea of historical consciousness also presents the key to Benedetto 
Croce’s theory of history. For two reasons Benjamin’s concept of historical time is 
closely related to that of Croce. Like Benjamin, Croce acknowledges the role of 
material forces in history, but questions the opposition between materialism and 
idealism, which becomes the basis for his critique of a positivist and deterministic 
understanding of historical time. And like Benjamin, he arrives at this position through 
a critique of the future-oriented discourse on the semantic of time, which marked the 
ideological and political climate of the interwar period. 
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Croce’s idealism was originally conceived as an antidote to the positivism which 
reigned in Italian academia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
While Norberto Bobbio has demonstrated that positivism hardly presented a serious 
philosophical position in Italy, it definitely marked the social sciences since the turn of 
the century, with an important direct impact on major political ideologies.34 As 
Momigliano explains, even in the arts and humanities positivism left its traces: “About 
1890 academic students of history or literature were often recommended to confine 
themselves to facts in the hope that later on perhaps all the facts could be interpreted 
by some general law – which would be the key to the understanding of history and 
art.”35 The Italian reception of Darwin played an important role in this development, 
first translated in 1864 by the Bolognese publisher Zanichelli, in the former Papal 
States, at a time when the old University of Bologna became the Mecca of new 
scientific approaches to knowledge. Italian liberal and socialist thought made explicit 
reference to social Darwinism and a handbook of socialist propaganda published in 
the 1890s advised its readers to first engage with Spencer and Darwin, before 
completing the triad with Marx.36  
 
At the end of the century a decisive reaction against simplistic social theories 
emerged in Italian academic debate. Endorsed by Croce, the Socialist Antonio 
Labriola was among the first to reject a positivistic interpretation of Marx. As Bobbio 
has argued, Croce’s “idealist reaction against positivism changed not only the 
general concept of philosophy but also the taste, the style and the affections and 
disaffections of an entire cultural epoch. (…) Positivism had sought to give a 
naturalist explanation even of manifestations of the spirit; idealism, repudiating all 
forms of naturalism, sought to give a spiritualist explanation even of natural 
phenomena.”37 Croce set out to bring positivism and idealism back into balance and 
with regard to concepts of time he argued that the future is contingent on the creative 
ideas and actions of individuals in the present. 
 
The way in which Croce rethinks the relationship between idealism and materialism 
makes it almost impossible to reduce his contribution to that of introducing Italians to 
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Hegel, as some commentators have done.38 Part of his turn against a deterministic 
understanding of history is rooted precisely in his critique of the teleological 
dimension of Hegel’s philosophy. As Croce explains in the epilogue to his Storia 
d’Europa of 1931, 
“Those who, contrary to the ancient warning of Solon, endeavour to 
understand and judge a life ‘before it is ended’ and who are lost in 
conjectures and previsions, should be beware lest this divagation into what it 
is impossible to know be not in fact the prompting of an evil demon, who is 
cradling them in indolence and distracting them from the task.  
 
Not the ‘history of the future’ (as the old writers used to define prophecy), but 
that of the past which is epitomized in the present, is necessary for work and 
for action – which would not be real action if it were not illumined by the light 
of truth.”39 
 
Croce refers here explicitly to the ideological implications of contemporary attempts 
to manipulate historical time, in particular the attempts of Futurists and Fascists. In 
his Antistoricismo, a paper of September 1930 read at the Seventh International 
Congress of Philosophy in Oxford, Croce criticized the current “decadence of 
historical sentiment” and the “extreme anti-historical attitude” which characterized the 
new ideologies and the contemporary political climate.40 For Croce, this new 
antistoricismo appeared under two different forms, one anarchical and one 
authoritarian, offering an insightful and also rather innovative analysis of these two 
poles of Fascist ideology. He rejected the Fascists’ new futurism as a “future without 
past”, which “adores force for the sake of force, doing for the sake of doing, the new 
for the sake of the new, life for the sake of life, a life which doesn’t keep a link with 
the past, because it doesn’t wish to be any particular life, but life in the abstract, mere 
vitality”.41 The second form of this new antistoricismo loathes “in the very idea of 
history the reign of relativism and the contingent, of mobility and diversity, of variation 
and individuality. It hopes for the absolute, for stability, leaving history, transcending 
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historicism in order to acquire security and peace.”42 Thus, it becomes stable, 
uncritical, authoritarian and totalitarian. “With regard to social life, it finds its ideal in 
an order which suppresses personal initiative, and thus competition and struggle, 
imposing rules instead.”43 For Croce, this form of antistoricismo reduces the historical 
process to just one possible future, denying history’s multi-faceted nature. 
 
What becomes clear in Croce’s Oxford paper is the extent to which his position 
articulates his reaction to Europe’s recent political and ideological developments. 
However, his concern is also rooted in the context of wider philosophical debates. 
Since the turn of the century Italy’s critical engagement with positivism, materialism 
and idealism represented an attempt to reconcile the Italian and European 
experiences of modernity and to make them meaningful in the context of Italy’s 
Finesecolo crisis, epitomized in Giosuè Carducci’s famous dictum that Italy, during its 
Risorgimento, had hoped for a Third Rome but got Byzantium instead.44 Despite this 
widespread consciousness of crisis, Italy’s intellectual debate at the time was 
characterized by a remarkable cosmopolitanism, which can be traced back to Italy’s 
enlightenment tradition, to the heroic idealism of the Risorgimento and the liberal 
foundations of the nation state, resulting in a philosophical tradition which made in its 
time a highly innovative and original contribution to European thought.45  
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Naples, where Croce lived and wrote for most of his life, played an important role in 
Italy’s engagement with European philosophy. Bertrando and Silvio Spaventa (both 
relatives of Croce), Francesco De Sanctis, Guido de Ruggiero and Benedetto Croce 
himself tried to connect the emergence of Italy’s modern statehood with the principles 
of Hegel’s dialectical philosophy of history and his philosophy of right, understanding 
the nation’s Risorgimento in terms of Hegel’s “ethical state”,46 not dissimilar to the 
ways in which the Prussian reformers saw their own state develop in the wake of the 
Napoleonic defeat. They established a philosophical framework for contemporary 
political and historical debates, which profoundly marked Italy’s intellectual life until 
the middle of the twentieth century and helped to connect Italian thought with the 
social, political and cultural developments elsewhere in Europe.47 In the context of 
these debates Benedetto Croce’s work as philosopher and historian presents a 
synthetic account of Europe’s and Italy’s experience of modernity since the 
Enlightenment. His project culminates in his History of Europe, dedicated to Thomas 
Mann, where he describes a century during which history no longer appeared 
“destitute of spirituality and abandoned to blind forces. Now it was seen to be the 
work and the activity of the spirit, and so since spirit is liberty, the work of liberty.”48 
His positive assessment of the nineteenth century is rooted in the author’s temporal 
perspective, writing during the early years of the Italian Fascist regime. His 
dedication to Mann includes a reference to Dante’s Inferno, a passage in which Virgil 
and Dante find themselves in great danger of being caught by demons – for Croce 
the demons of the new totalitarian systems, political regimes without history.49  
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In the first three chapters of Croce’s History of Europe, conceived as a general 
introduction to the work as a whole, he outlined his idea of “history as the history of 
freedom”. Ideas and passions drove the intellectual, political, social and cultural elites 
within the various ideological currents of their time - from the church to the liberal 
movement and including socialist and nationalist ideologies. However, the historical 
process is not determined by the ideas themselves, but by the social, economic and 
political structures from which they emerge and which they create. On this basis 
Croce attempts to reconcile the opposition between the idealist foundations of 
nineteenth-century European thought and the materialist conception of history – an 
opposition which had been introduced by Marx and Engels in 1845/46, in their 
chapter on Feuerbach in The German Ideology. Although during their lifetime the 
relevant passages of the work had never been published, their critique of what they 
called the “Hegelian system” became the basis of the modern Marxist conception of 
history. 
 
Rather than understanding “history of freedom” in an abstract fashion and as a 
deterministic teleological development, for Croce the “rationalisation and idealisation 
of historical forces in relation to the concept of freedom”50 is a natural consequence 
of the capacitating forces of the enlightenment, in Kantian terms the consequence of 
the liberation from self-incurred tutelage. In this sense Croce’s concept resembles 
Moses Mendelssohn’s explanation of the enlightenment as a “modification of societal 
life” which affects “people’s efforts and strivings to improve their societal existence”. 
Aufklärung, for Mendelssohn, is “vernünftiges thinking about the things of human 
life”.51 Hegel develops his concept of freedom in the Philosophy of Right, explaining it 
as “ethical life” in the “existing world”.52 For Croce, freedom is not so much a 
historical reality but a way of thinking the past:  
“Historical sentiment and liberal sentiment are indivisible, to the extent that 
history can’t be defined in any better way than as ‘history of freedom’, 
because this is the only way to give it a sense and to make it intelligible. No 
doubt that in history we also find theocratic and autocratic regimes, violent 
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regimes and reactions, counterreformation, dictatorships and tyranny; but 
what always resurges, proceeds and develops is freedom”.53  
 
Obviously, Croce makes a difference between the past and history, whereby history 
is only the past made by man and historical reality a condition of the mind, an 
intellectual reconstruction of the past.54 As Max Scheler explained, this capacity to 
reflect in abstract terms about humanity’s existence, outside a specific historical 
context, represents a fundamental anthropological characteristic of man’s 
cosmological experience.55 For Croce “the historical sentiment coincides with the 
European sentiment”. It is with reference to the new semantic of time, observed in 
the discourse of recent ideological currents, where Croce identifies a dangerous 
departure from the European tradition.56 His argument is directed against any form of 
authoritarian nationalism, as it came to prevail in Europe since the late 19th century. 
This concern about the ideological transformation within nationalist thought shares 
common ground with that of another great historian of his time, Friedrich Meinecke, 
the author of Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat.57 
 
In this context it is revealing that Croce’s Storia d’Europa also provides an early 
version of the theory of the German Sonderweg,58 a devastating account of the 
historical evolution of the German sense of liberty since the Reformation, which led to 
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a liberation of the spirit and of critical scientific enquiry, but at the same time 
introduced a cult of the prince and the state, which, in Croce’s view, ultimately 
divorced the freedom of the spirit from that of politics. Pointing to Croce’s theory of a 
German Sonderweg is important not only because it has certain implications for his 
view of “Italian Fascism as an eclipse”, but also because it demonstrates that his 
concept of history as the history of freedom did not blind him for critical evaluations of 
teleological concepts of history. Exemplified by his evaluation of the Revolution of 
1848, for Croce the German people seemed incapable of a true liberal 
transformation. German national sentiment was never fused with the ideal of political 
liberty, as it became the rule for other peoples during the nineteenth century. The 
reasons for this are not to be found in racial determinism, but in the people’s 
historical development.  
 
Thomas Mann, to whom Croce dedicated his History of Europe, was able to identify 
with this analysis. In his initial response to Croce’s Antistoricismo, Mann defended 
Nietzsche’s critique of historicity on the basis that German historicism has had a 
particularly weakening effect on life; but then he explains that Nietzsche’s 
antistoricismo had to be read within its particular historical context, whereas “now it is 
at the order of the day to reconstitute what is essential to the sense of history, 
defined as civiltà e cultura.”59 Despite his critical account of Germany’s emergence 
as a modern nation state, Croce initially refused to give up his belief that Germany, 
within a wider context of European culture, had the capacity of constructing a more 
developed sense of civiltà. He pointed to a vital connection between the development 
of German and European culture, to the extent that Europe is deeply indebted to 
Germany for the theoretical conceptualisation of its notion of liberty. However, 
Germany’s spiritual-political development had brought it into a deep opposition to 
Europe as a whole. Meanwhile, Croce understood his account of “storia prussiana, 
bismarckiana, treitschkiana, nazionalistica ecc non certamente favorevoli” as the 
source of his critical reassessment of Italy’s own national history.60 Only later, under 
the impression of the unimaginable brutality of the German occupation of Italy, he 
lost his hope that the immense “spiritual dissent” which separates Germany from 
Europe could ever be bridged, if not through the construction of a united Europe, in 
which Germany will finally find its place “not as barbaric master and torturer, but as 
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one people among other peoples, as one of the strongest in the race which defines 
the life of mankind and of civilisation.”61  
 
As mentioned earlier, Croce’s rejection of positivism was at the origin of his interest 
in Hegel. Like Hegel, Croce placed history at the centre of his new humanism, but his 
was an “absolute historicism”, a history without God. While taking account of man’s 
capacity to reason, he rejects the notion of abstract reason in the Hegelian sense. In 
particular, his idealism is not a force which provokes changes in the course of history 
through the invention of artificial utopias. Thus, he questioned the Enlightenment’s 
belief in humankind as well as Hegel’s faith in progress. It was on this basis that 
Croce continued to take account of materialist forces in a Marxist sense and that he 
developed a lively interest in those exponents of European social theory, which 
seemed to be able to explain social and economic phenomena in a non-positivistic 
fashion and without recurrence to simplistic laws of social development. He read 
Simmel and Durkheim, and initiated Italian editions of Max Weber’s and Walter 
Rathenau’s works through his publisher Laterza. Meanwhile, he also engaged with 
the neo-Kantian Windelband; with Dilthey, whose theory of Geisteswissenschaft 
claimed the identity of subject and object in historical research; and he showed an 
early interest in Freud’s Die Traumdeutung, at a time when the Viennese was still 
largely unknown among Italian social scientists.62 With the help of social theory 
Croce hoped to identify the material conditions of historical processes, without 
recurring to the positivism of Italy’s more conventional social scientists.  
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Croce’s engagement with social theory became the basis for his reconciliation 
between materialism and idealism, a concept of history which closely resembled 
Benjamin’s revision of historical materialism. For Croce there is a material and 
political dimension to the life of the mind, which the historian has to take account of. 
As Giuseppe Galasso explained, “for Croce spiritualism does not mean the abstract 
idealisation of certain factors of the historical process... It only means the affirmation 
of a gnoseology and of a logic, which aims at pushing the transcendental premises of 
classical-Hegelian idealism to the extreme. Therefore, human reality, as subject and 
object, covers everything which is known or which can be known. For the reality of 
man, as subject or object, the only adequate way of knowing is historical.”63 For 
Croce, this knowing was subjective and presentist. At the time historical materialism 
represented for Italians the dominating approach to historical research, most 
famously represented by the historian Gaetano Salvemini, who is today mostly 
remembered as a Socialist and anti-Fascist politician. Marxism influenced Italy’s 
philosophical debate well beyond the often rather narrow readings of the Labour 
movement, spreading even to Gentile and Volpe, who later aligned themselves with 
Fascism.64 For Croce, historical materialism became the basis for a realistic concept 
of history that considered the economic base as an objective parameter of historical 
change. Meanwhile, his idealism and his historical consciousness stood against the 
simplistic construction of future oriented teleologies based on the positivist reading of 
social phenomena. Conceptualized as a “philosophy of practice”, Croce’s synthesis 
between idealism and materialism presents the most important conception of 
historical time since Hegel and Marx.  
 
This “philosophy of praxis” had a direct impact on the ways in which Italy addressed 
the experience of modernity, and of World War One in particular. Antonio Gramsci’s 
intellectual crusade against the Left’s deterministic attendismo in the face of fascism 
can’t be explained without reference to Croce.65 His critique of positivistic materialism 
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started from Croce’s idealism, understood as a subjectivist conception of history.66 
For Gramsci the belief in any rational development of history was at the root of the 
attendismo with which he wished to break. The logic behind such erroneous 
conceptions of history was the storm which rushed humanity into catastrophe.  
 
While both Croce and Gentile arrived at their respective positions through a revision 
of Hegelian doctrine, Gentile’s absorption of the individual in the State resulted in “the 
annihilation of individual autonomy and liberty”, the contrary of Croce’s own concept 
of freedom.67 Due to his failure to acknowledge the relationship between the crisis of 
Liberalism and the advent of Fascism, Croce’s History of Italy and his History of 
Europe have rightly been challenged by post-war historiography, reversing their initial 
importance since the 1920s. Initially, like many Italian liberals, Croce saw (and 
underestimated) Fascism as a reaction to the threat of a Socialist revolution. Soon he 
came to understand Fascism as the antithesis of liberal Italy. Contrary to Croce, for 
Gramsci Fascism was the natural consequence of the social conflicts liberal Italy had 
itself generated, a position which became almost canonical among post-war 
historians. If Croce depicted Fascism as a parenthesis in the history of Italy it was 
primarily an attempt to reject the Fascists’ own claims of a logical continuity between 
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the Risorgimento and Fascism.68 Confronted with the Fascists’ claims, Croce wished 
to protect the reputation of the liberal period (and the years of Giolitti’s governments 
in particular). At the end of the war the same argument served Italy to convince the 
Allies that there were differences between German National socialism (understood to 
be deeply rooted in German history) and Italian Fascism (presented as having little to 
do with the glorious tradition of the Risorgimento and the liberal nation state).  
 
Despite the inherent inconsistencies of this theory, Croce’s History of Italy and his 
History of Europe were born out of his own opposition to Fascism. In their time they 
presented themselves as empirical applications of a theoretical conceptualisation of 
historical time, which in itself formed a synthetic product of Europe’s political and 
intellectual life between the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, 
standing alongside his treatises on aesthetics and literature as a defence of 
European culture in the face of Fascism. Belonging to the intellectual milieu which 
Zweig described as The World of Yesterday, Croce collaborated during those years 
with André Gide, Aldous Huxley, Heinrich Mann, Romain Rolland, Jean Cocteau, 
Boris Pasternak and many others for Klaus Mann’s anti-Fascist periodical Die 
Sammlung,  representing a Europe which refused to surrender its humanist values.69 
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This intellectual context makes it difficult to reduce Croce’s role in European thought 
to his view of Fascism as an eclipse within the development of liberal Italy. In 
Galasso’s words, the History of Europe was “a political polemic”, which held 
European values up against “the totalitarianism and nationalism” of the present 
political situation and against “the decadence and the irrationalism” of its cultural 
life.70 It was a product of Croce’s own experience of historical time as crisis. 
 
How close Benjamin’s concept of history is to that of Croce has been noted (but not 
further explored) by Stéphane Mosès in his L’Ange de l’Histoire. The transformation 
of the past depends on the present of the historian, which both authors experienced 
in similar ways.71 Like in the case of Croce, also for Benjamin the positivism of the 
social and historical sciences was an important target of his new concept of historical 
time.72 Moreover, what Benjamin and Croce shared was their pluralistic view of the 
past as a way to counter simplistic teleologies of history. Meanwhile, both 
acknowledged the conceptual roots of their approach in historical materialism. They 
developed their theories of history on the contemplative basis of their own historical-
empirical research: Croce published his Storia dell’eta barocca in Italia in 1929, the 
same year Benjamin’s Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels appeared as a book, a 
work which anticipates several important elements of Über den Begriff der 
Geschichte.73 Benjamin’s Paris of the Passagenwerk was Croce’s Naples. In 
Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, partly written in Croce’s own backwater, on 
Capri, Benjamin quoted at length from Croce’s Aesthetic. Discussing Croce’s critique 
of “genre” as an artificial scheme of aesthetic classification leads Benjamin to reject a 
history of ideas conceived as a “pseudo-logical continuum”, following simplistic 
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teleological schemes of historical development.74 In this they both went against the 
established scholarly orthodoxies of Geistesgeschichte. But the point here is not to 
establish to what extent Benjamin was influenced by Croce. Instead, what matters is 
the fact that it was the experience of time as crisis which led both authors to develop 
a new concept of history and to reconsider the relationship between materialism and 
idealism.  
 
This parallel analysis of Croce’s and Benjamin’s theory of history is an attempt to 
understand the crisis of the early twentieth century as a short but crucial moment of 
change in the semantic of historical time, with major implications for the philosophical 
foundations of modern European thought. Arguing from a number of very different 
perspectives, historians and cultural commentators from Theodor W. Adorno to Alan 
Milward (among many others) have understood the post-war period in terms of 
Restoration, questioning the extent to which 1945 represents a new beginning or a 
Stunde Null. The same pattern of reinstatement seems to apply to the way cultural 
theorists after 1945 have dealt with the relationship between idealism and 
materialism as a way of conceptualising historical time and the experience of 
modernity. As soon as the moment of crisis had passed – as far as the trauma of the 
war and the Shoah ever passes – European thought returned to think within 
established orthodoxies. Croce’s work largely disappeared into oblivion - at least 
outside Italy and outside the specialized debates of philosophers. During Benjamin’s 
the first renaissance, in the 1960s, commentators made him the object of passionate 
fights between different factions of Marxists, before the emphasis on the theological 
component of his work gained wider resonance. Koselleck’s studies on the semantics 
of historical time offer a new context to read both Croce and Benjamin as part of a 
general rethinking of the social and cultural sciences. 
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